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Abstract 
In this paper we extend the influence diagram 
(ID) representation for decisions under 
uncertainty. In the standard ID, arrows into a 
decision node are only infonnational; they do 
not represent constraints on what the decision 
maker can do. We can represent such constraints 
only indirectly, using arrows to the children of 
the decision and sometimes adding more 
variables to the influence diagram, thus making 
the ID more complicated. Users of influence 
diagrams often want to represent constraints by 
arrows into decision nodes. We represent 
constraints on decisions by allowing relevance 
arrows into decisions nodes. We call the 
resulting representation information/relevance 
influence diagrams (IRIDs). Infonnation/ 
relevance influence diagrams allow for direct 
representation and specification of constrained 
decisions. We use a combination of stochastic 
dynamic programming and Gibbs sampling to 
solve IRIDs. This method is especially useful 
when exact methods for solving IDs fail. 
Key Words: Decision analysis, influence diagrams, 
asymmetric decision problems, stochastic dynamic 
programming, Markov chain Monte Carlo, Gibbs 
sampling. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we introduce a variation on influence 
diagrams that allows the use of arrows into decision nodes 
to represent constraints as well as information. We call 
this new representation an Information I Relevance 
Influence Diagram (IRID). In an IRID, we model a 
decision variable that is constrained by other variables by 
drawing relevance arrows from the other variables to the 
decision variable. But we also still allow purely 
infonnational arrows into decision nodes. 
Information/relevance influence diagrams allow for direct 
representation and specification of constrained decisions. 
This representation is a partial solution to the broader 
problem of representing and solving asymmetric decision 
problems. Asymmetry in decision problems occurs when 
some values of decision and/or chance variables are not 
allowed given certain values of their predecessors. 
Recent works by Smith et al. (1993), Shenoy (1993) and 
all the references therein offer a more complete treatment 
of this problem. However, none of them provide a direct 
and explicit representation of asymmetries concerning 
decision variables. 
The advantage of our representation lies in the solution 
method we use to evaluate !RIDs. This method is a 
combination of stochastic dynamic programming and 
Gibbs sampling, an iterative Markov chain Monte Carlo 
algorithm (Jenzarli, 1995). This method allows us to 
model asymmetries concerning chance variables by using 
zero-one conditionals. Our solution method is especially 
useful when exact methods for solving influence diagrams 
fail. 
In this paper we assume that the reader is already familiar 
with directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), and belief networks 
(Pearl, 1988). Briefly, we defme a BN as a DAG in 
which nodes represent variables, together with a 
specification for each variable of a conditional probability 
distribution for that variable given its parents. (If there 
are no parents, this is a marginal probability distribution 
for the variable.) It is assumed that the joint probability 
distribution of the variables is the product of these 
conditional probability distributions. 
We also assume that the reader is already familiar with 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (Hastings, 1970) and Gibbs 
sampling (Geman and Geman, 1984; and Gelfand and 
Smith, 1990). 
We organize this paper as follows. In Section 2 we 
review influence diagrams (IDs) and their properties. In 
Section 3 we describe solutions algorithms for IDs. In 
Section 4 we describe infonnation/relevance influence 
diagrams. In Section 5 we adapt the Gibbs sampling 
algorithm of Jenzarli (1995) to !RIDs and illustrate with 
an example. 
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2 INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
In this section we review influence diagrams (IDs) and 
their properties. We describe the assumptions on which 
the ID decision model is based. And, we conclude with a 
note on randomization. We use a numerical example to 
illusttate ideas and concepts where appropriate. 
Let us begin by recalling the standard definition of an 
influence diagram. 
Definition 1. An influence diagram (ID) is a DAG 
with variables as nodes, together with a specification 
for only some of the variables of conditionals given 
their parents. We call those variables with conditionals 
chance variables, and those without decision variables. 
For each chance variable, we specify a set of possible 
values. For each decision variable, we specify a set of 
admissible values that we call decision alternatives. An 
ID has a special chance node that is a sink and that is a 
deterministic function of its parents. We call this node 
the value node. Arrows into chance nodes are called 
relevance arrows while arrows into decision nodes are 
called informational arrows. 
Consider the oil wildcatter's problem adapted from Raiffa 
(1968). The wildcatter has to decide whether to drill or 
not drill. This decision is represented by the decision 
variable D whose values are d (drill) and nd (not drill). 
The values d and nd are decision alternatives. The 
wildcatter is uncertain about the amount of oil in the well. 
The amount of oil in the well is represented by the chance 
variable 0, whose possible values are w (wet) and y (dry). 
The cost of drilling is $950,000, and the estimated 
revenue from drilling a wet well is $2,000,000. Table 1 
shows the wildcatter's net monetary payoffs and his 
subjective probabilities for 0. 
d obl Table 1. Pavoff table for the wil catter s pr em 
D 
d nd Probability of 
State (drill) (not drill) State 
y (dry) -$950,000 0 0.4 
0 
w (wet) $1 050000 $0 0.6 
More information about the amount of oil in the well can 
be obtained by conducting one of two seismic tests; test1 
is standard and relatively affordable, while test2 is 
advanced and more costly. The seismic testing decision is 
represented by the decision variable T, whose values are 
t1 (test1), t2 (test2) and nt (no test). The seismic test 
result is represented by the chance variable R, whose 
values are o (open structure), supporting a dry well, c 
(closed structure), supporting a wet well, and or (no 
result), indicating that no seismic test has been performed. 
Finally, the payoff function is represented by the value 
node V, which is a function of 0, T and D. 
Figure 1 shows an ID for the oil wildcatter's problem, 
where chance variables are shown as circles, decision 
variables as rectangles, and the value node as a diamond. 
Figure 1. Influence diagram for the oil wildcatter's 
roblem 
Chance variables in an ID are interpreted just as they are 
in a BN. The conditional probability 
P(X=xjX1 =x1, X2 =x2, ... , ?'t =xt } . (1) that we specify for a chance vartable X mdtcates our 
belief that X will take the value x when its parents, the Xi , 
take the values Xi. For the sake of generality, we will not 
rule out the possibility that the values of the conditional 
probability are unaffected as we change some of the Xi . 
By drawing arrows to X from all the Xi we signal that we 
think X depends on them all, and that we expect to specify 
values for (1) that do depend on them all. But if 
assessment of the probabilities follows the construction of 
the DAG, this expectation may fail to be fulfilled. In 
Figure 1 the chance variable R depends on the values of 
the decision variable T and the chance variable 0. The 
conditional probability distribution of R given T and 0 is 
shown in Table 2. Notice that the conditional probability 
of R given T = nt and 0 remains unchanged whether 0 = 
w or O= y. 
Table 2. Conditional probability distribution of R given 
T and O  
R 
T 0 0 c m 
t1 w 0.2 0.8 0 
t1 y 0.9 0.1 0 
t2 w 0.05 0.95 0 
t2 y 0.95 0.05 0 
It w 0 0 1 
It :1_ 0 0 1 
The decision maker can be asked to supply in advance a 
policy for the decision at each decision v�ble .t. . This 
policy usually takes the form of a spectficatton of a 
decision alternative for each configuration of the parents 
of the decision variable. For example, in Figure 1, when 
the oil wildcatter must decide whether to drill or not drill, 
he does so knowing his earlier choice at the decision 
variable T as well as the value of the chance variable R. 
The result of such a policy can be interpreted as a 
conditional for Ji given its parents. This conditional 
gives only probabilities of zero and one: 
)-{1 ifd=O(xp ... ,xt) 2 P(t.=diXl=x,, ... , Xt=xt - Oifd*O(x,, ... ,xt),() 
where ()(x1, ••• ,xk) is the decision alternative that the 
decision maker deterministically chooses when he or she 
observes the values x1, ... ,xk of the parents. For 
example, in Figure 1, the wildcatter may supply a policy 
where he would use test2, i.e., T=t2, and drill only if T=t2 
andR = c. 
Notice that by supplying in advance conditionals for the 
decision variables, the decision maker turns the ID into a 
BN; he or she now has conditionals for all the variables 
given their parents. 
In general, a chance node X in a BN or ID is called 
deterministic if its conditional is of the type (2), where a 
is replaced by X, d is replaced by x and ()(x1, ... ,xk) is 
replaced by f(x1, ... ,xt), f being the deterministic 
function that gives a value for X for every configuration 
x1, ... ,xk of the parents. We assume that an ID has 
exactly one sink, which is a deterministic chance node and 
which has real numbers for its values. The decision 
maker's purpose is to choose conditionals for the decision 
variables so as to maximize or minimize (optimize) the 
expectation of this node, which is called the value node 
and designated by V. 
The decision maker may, if he or she wants, adopt a 
policy that makes the conditional for a decision variable 
depend on only some or none of its parents. For example, 
the wildcatter may adopt a policy that makes his 
conditional for whether to drill or not drill based only on 
the value of R, but not on the value ofT. In some cases, 
we can tell from the structure of the graph (without 
numerical calculations based on the conditionals for the 
chance nodes) that the best policy based on only some 
parents will do as well as the best policy based on them 
all. If some parents are omitted, then the corresponding 
arrows can be omitted; the graph with these arrows 
omitted will still be an ID, and once the decision maker 
has specified all the conditionals, it will be a BN. In 
general, description and computation in a BN or ID is 
easier with fewer arrows, so the decision maker would 
like to omit as many arrows as possible, but he or she may 
have to make his or her policy depend on all or most of 
the decision variables' parents in order to optimize the 
expectation of the value node. Thus the decision maker's 
objective is to make the policy depend on as few of the 
parents as possible while still optimizing the expectation 
of the value node. 
Recall that the arrows into chance nodes are called 
relevance arrows and arrows into decision nodes are 
called informational arrows. Informational arrows 
indicate that the decision maker has certain information, 
not that he or she must use it. The relevance arrows will 
all remain in the BN that the decision maker constructs 
with his or her choice of conditionals for the decision 
variables, but the decision maker essentially omits 
informational arrows when he or she chooses a 
conditional that does not depend on the nodes from which 
these arrows come. 
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Following Clemen (1991), we distinguish between 
informational arrows and relevance arrows by 
representing the former with dashed arrows while still 
using solid arrows to represent the latter. Notice that 
decision variables are treated just like chance variables 
when they are parents. The difference between an 
informational and a relevance arrow depends on the kind 
of variable the arrow points to, not on the kinds of 
variables it comes from. 
We follow Howard and Matheson (1981) and most of the 
ID literature in making two additional assumptions: 
1. The decisions are all made by a single decision 
maker who remembers his or her previous decisions. 
This assumption is represented by the existence of a 
path in the DAG consisting only of all the decision 
variables. In other words, the decision variables are 
ordered, say al,a2, ... ,ak, so that there is an arrow 
from ai to ai+t• for i =  1, 2, ... , k-1. We summarize 
this by saying that the decision variables are completely 
ordered by the DAG. 
2. The decision maker does not forget any previous 
information as he or she progresses through the 
decisions. This assumption is represented by the 
existence of an arrow from X to a i whenever there is 
an arrow from X to ai and i<j. In other words, each 
decision node inherits the parents of preceding decision 
nodes. This is called the no-forgetting assumption. 
Notice that a decision variable need not inherit the 
parents of chance variables that precede it. In Figure 1, 
for example, there is no arrow from 0 to D. 
We conclude this section with a note on randomization 
that we include for completeness and that the reader may 
omit without loss of continuity. Recall that the decision 
maker can be asked to supply in advance a policy for the 
decision at each decision variable a . As we discussed 
above this policy can take the form of a specification of a 
decision alternative for each configuration of the parents 
of the decision variable. This policy can also take the 
form of a probability distribution over the decision 
alternatives for each configuration of the parents of the 
decision variable. For example, in Figure 1, the wildcatter 
has the option of choosing a probability distribution over 
the decision alternatives of whether to drill or not drill. In 
this case a probability distribution must be specified for 
each configuration of D's parents. For instance, he may 
decide to drill with probability 113 given T=tl and R=o, 
with probability 112 given T=tl and R=c, with probability 
1/5 given T=t2 and R=o, with probability 9/10 given T=t2 
and R=c, and with probability 114 given T=nt and R=nr. 
The result of such a policy can be interpreted as a 
conditional for a given its parents. Again, the decision 
maker has conditionals for all the variables given their 
parents, and the ID becomes a BN. The decision maker's 
objective is still to make the policy depend on as few of 
the parents as possible while optimizing the expectation of 
the value node. 
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However, in optimizing the expectation of the value node, 
there is no advantage to randomization because of the 
convexity of the set of probability distributions that can be 
attained (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). Indeed, 
when we look at bow the expectation of the value node V 
is affected by varying the conditional for a particular 
decision node .d -futing for the moment conditionals for 
the other decision variables-we see that this expectation 
is an average of the expectations for V that would be 
obtained by fixed decision functions for .d . Such an 
average cannot be better than the best of the expectations 
being averaged (Dantzig, 1951). So instead of using 
conditionals for decision alternatives, researchers have 
traditionally used decision functions (Howard and 
Matheson, 1981). 
3 SOLVING INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
Solution algorithms for IDs can all be described as 
elaborations of various forms of the principle of 
optimality in stochastic dynamic programming, which 
allows us to fmd the decision functions in problems of this 
type sequentially (Bellman and Dreyfus, 1962). 
In its standard form, the principle of optimality in 
stochastic dynamic programming applies when we want 
to maximize or minimize the expectation of a real-valued 
variable V whose joint distribution with k+ 1 other 
variables r 0, r 1, ... , r It (which may each be vectors of 
variables) depends in a stagewise manner on k parameters 
(which also may be single numbers, vectors or functions) 
51, ... , alt. More precisely, we assume that we can factor 
the joint probability for r 0, r 1, ... , r 1c and v in the form 
P61, ... ,6t (r0, ••• , r  It• V) = b0(r 0)b61 (r1lr 0) • • •  
. . .  h6 <r�c-1lro, ... , rlt-2)h6 <r�c,VIro, ... , rlt-1>• (3) k� k 
where the factors are conditional probabilities. We must 
also assume that it is com�utationally feasible to compute 
from 
E6k(v1ro ..... rlt-1) 
b6t (r It• VIr o ..... r lt-1) 
for each value of alt and each configuration of values of 
r 0u ... ur Jt-1, or at least to find for each configuration 
('Yo····· 'Y�c-d of r 0u ... ur �c-1 the value of S�c that 
optimizes 
E6t(vlro ='Yo· ···•rk-1 ='Y�c-1)· (4) 
Finally, we must assume (this is crucial) that we can fmd 
a single value of ale that optimizes (4) for all 
('Yo·····'Y�c-tl· Since the distribution of r0u ... ur�c_1 
does not depend on alt. we have 
E61 ..... 6t (V) = E61 ..... 6t-l (E6k (vir o •... , r  lt-1)) . 
Therefore, this optimizing value of Sit will also optimize 
the unconditional expectation E61 ... A (V) for any choice 
of (51, . . .  ,5�_1). And therefore, it can be extended to a choice of t51, . . .  ,SJt) to optimize this unconditional 
expectation. 
Suppose we fix this optimal value of St eliminating it 
from our notation, and reducing (3) to 
b61•"'•6t-l (r O•····r It• V) = ho(r o)b61 (r11r o) ... 
... b6H (r lt-1lro.····r lt-2)b(r It• VIr o, ... , r  lt-1>· (5) 
From this point, we proceed in either of two ways. We 
can sum or integrate r It out of the expectation. Or we 
can incorporate r t as part of r t-1· 
h3 <rt-1•vlro, ... , r�c-2>= t-l 
b6k-l (r lt-dr O•····r lt-2> J b( 'Yt· VIr o .... ,r lt-1)i'Yk. 
Once again, we assume that we can choose a single value 
of 5�c_1 so as to optimize simultaneously 
E6 <VIro ='Yo.r1 =y1, ... , r1t-2 ='Y�c-2> (6) k-1 
for all ( 'Y 0, . . .  , 'Y It-2 } . Then, as before, the choice of o k-1 
can be extended to a choice of (S1, .. . ,Sit_1) to optimize 
the unconditional expectation 
So we may also fiX this optimal value of o1H, and reduce 
the problem further. We can continue in this way, 
choosing the oi sequentially, provided that the successive 
simultaneous optimizations like those in (4), (6), etc. are 
possible. 
The second option means setting rJ.:_1 = r Jt-1 u r It• and 
reducing (5) to 
b6,, ... ,6t I (r o ..... r lt-1• V) = ho(r o)h6, (rt lr o>··· - . . .  h3 <rt-1•v ro ..... rt-2>· 
where 
t-1 
h3 <rt-1• v1r o·····r 1c-2> = t-1 b6t-l (r lt-11r o, ... , r  k-2>h(r It• VIr o ..... r It-t ) · 
Again, if we can choose 5t_1 to optimize simultaneously 
(6) for all (y0, ••• ,ylt_2), and so on, we can proceed to 
choose the 8i sequentially. 
This standard version of stochastic dynamic programming 
is not quite adequate for the case of influence diagrams. 
The reason is that although these diagrams involve 
factorizations that can be written in the form (3), the 
factors are not necessarily conditional probabilities. 
The standard version of stochastic dynamic programming 
can be modified to fit influence diagrams, but there bas 
been a considerable variety of opinion about bow to do 
this. The oldest sequential solution algorithm for 
influence diagrams, the Olmsted-Shacbter reduction 
algorithm (Olmsted, 1983; Shachter, 1986) goes 
considerably beyond stochastic dynamic programming, in 
order to maintain a representation of the influence 
diagram form as the algorithm proceeds. More recent 
algorithms, including the valuation network algorithm of 
Sbenoy (1992 and 1993) and the potential influence 
diagram algorithm of Ndilikilikesba (1992), stay closer to 
stochastic dynamic programming. 
The simulation algorithm we will describe in Section 5, 
does not fit exactly into either Sbenoy's or Ndilikilikesba's 
framework, primarily because their algorithms integrate 
r k out, while our algorithm follows the second option 
described above, that of absorbing r k into h11 • We 
could elaborate one of their frameworks in orderttb make 
our algorithm fit, but it will be simpler for us to deal 
directly with the necessary modification in the standard 
form of stochastic dynamic programming that we have 
just described. 
Here is the modification that we require. Let us assume 
that the joint probability for r 0' r 1 ' ... ' r k and v is 
proportional to a factorization of the following form 
P��t .... ��t (r0, • •• rk, V)oc h0{r0}hllt(ro)(rdro�·· 
... h� ( ... r )(r t-1!r o .... , r  k-2)· 0k-l 1 0•"'' k-Z 
·h��t(ro ..... rt-t)(r k• vlro .... , r  k-1) (7) 
Here we do � assume that the factors are conditional 
probabilities. But we .W assume that the 8i are functions; 
and we assume, as the notation indicates, that for fixed 
values of ro.rt>:···r k-1• the factor bllt lro . ..rt-1.)' regarded as a function of r k and V, depends on 8k onry 
through the value Sk assigns to those values of 
r 0, r 1, ... , r k-1 . This assumption, as we will see implies 
that the simultaneous optimizations at each step are 
possible. 
Notice first that the factorization (7) implies that 
ha (r r )(rt,vlro, ... , rt-1), k 0, ... , k-1 
for ftxed values of r 0, r1 , ... , r  k-1, is at least proportional 
to the conditional probability distribution for r k and V 
given these values of r 0, r 1, ... , r t-1 . To see this, recall 
that a conditional probability distribution is always 
proportional to the corresponding joint probability 
distribution. Thus 
P11" ... . 11t (r k• v1r 0, ... , r  k-1) = AI\ ..... at (r 0, ••• r k• v), (8) 
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where A. is constant with respect to r k and V. (The 
other variables are thought of as ftxed.) We usually write 
(8) with a symbol of proportionality: 
Pa" .... at (r k• Vlro, ... , rt-1)oc Pal ..... at (ro, ... r k• V). 
Since only the last factor of (7) involves r k or V, (8) 
implies that 
P��t ..... &t (r k• VIr 0, ... , r  k-1) oc 
h�(ro ..... rt-J)(r k• VIr o, ... , r  t-d · 
Again, this proportionality is to be interpreted by taking 
both sides as functions of r k and V only, with the other 
variables ftxed; we are able to omit the other factors only 
because they, as functions of the other variables, are also 
fixed and hence can be absorbed into the constant of 
proportionality. 
Whenever a function is proportional to a probability 
distribution (or probability conditional), it contains all the 
information needed to find that conditional because the 
constant of proportionality is simply what is needed to 
make the function sum (or integrate) to one. Thus 
h11 (Y 1 )(rt,vlro =ro ..... rk-t ='Yt-t) t 0•"'' t-1 
bas, in particular, all the information needed to determine 
the conditional e�ctation � V given ('Yo_:_ ... , 'Y �-1), 
Eat(Y0, ... ,yt_, )tr k• Vlro- 'Yo ..... r t-1- 'Yt-1)· (9) 
We can choose the value of 8t(y0, ... , 'Yt-1) to optimize 
this expectation, and by doing this for each set of values 
(ro .... ,yk-1), we will have chosen a function sk that 
simultaneously optimizes (9) for all ( 'Y 0, ••• , 'Y k-1) . 
Once this choice of Sk bas been carried out, we can 
proceed, as before: abso�bing h11t(r 0 ... ..rt,, ) into h11t_,(r,o ..... r t-l), ftrst mtegrating 'Yt out tf we wtsh to do so. Thts means replacing the factor in the second line of 
(7) with a factor 
where 
(1) r�t_1 = r k-1 u r k, 
(2) �k, which is in r k, is now interpreted as a chance 
node, and 
(3) h� _1(ro ... ..rt_z)(r�t, VIr o .... , r  k-2) = 
hx (r r )(rt-1lro, ... , rt-2)· "k-1 0 ,. 0 ., t.-2 
·h�t (�klr o, ... , r  k-t}h11� (r k• VIr o, ... ,r k-1). 
where s; is the optimal decision function and h � is 
the zero-one conditional representing s;. t 
In order to fit influence diagrams into this version of 
stochastic dynamic programming, we write r i for the set 
of variables consisting of �i together with the chance 
variables observed by the decision maker between �i and 
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ai+1• for i =  1, ... , k-1, we write ro for the chance 
variables observed before a1 and r t for the set of 
variables consisting of lit together with the chance 
variables (other than V) observed after lit (or never), and 
we write 8i for the decision function for ai. Then we set 
h0(r 0) equal to the product of conditionals for the 
chance variables in r 0• For i = 1, ... , k-1, we set 
h11 (rdr 0, ... ,ri _1 ) equal to the product of conditionals 
foi the chance variables in r i, times the conditional 
corresponding to the decision function 8i (recall Formula 
(2)). And we similarly set h11 (r t• vir 0, ... ,r t-1) equal 
to the product of the conditionals for all variables in 
rt u{V}. Since h11 (rt,VIr0, ... , rt_t) depends on 
at only through its val� 8t(r o ..... r t-1). this puts us in 
the framework just described. 
In the computational theory of Section 5 we will use 
Gibbs sampling to implement the method just described. 
4 INFORMA TIONIRELEVANCE 
INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
In the standard influence diagram, arrows into a decision 
node are only informational; they do not represent 
constraints on what the decision maker can do. We can 
represent such constraints only indirectly, using arrows to 
the children of the decision. 
Users of influence diagrams often want to represent 
constraints by arrows into decision nodes. For example, a 
user might draw Figure 2 in an attempt to represent the 
fact that the budget, B, constrains the options for testing 
and drilling. However, Figure 2 cannot represent such 
constraints because the dashed arrows are only 
informational, and the figure does not show B having any 
relevance to any chance variables. If Figure 2 is 
interpreted as a standard influence diagram, then variable 
B will have absolutely no effect on the optimal decision 
functions; they are the same with or without it 
Figure l. ID for the oil wildcatter's problem with 
bud et constraint as information onl 
,. 
0---
In order to represent a budget constraint using the 
standard ID representation, we would have to complicate 
the diagram of Figure 2 in some way. One way is 
represented in Figure 3. Here D' is a deterministic chance 
node representing whether drilling actually takes place as 
a function of the budget and the decision maker's 
decisions. For example, if the possible budget amounts 
are $1M (million) or $2M (million), the tests costs are 
$50,000 for testl and $100,000 for test2, and the cost of 
drilling is $950,000, then the decision maker cannot drill 
if B =$1M and T = t2. Using Figure 3, we can represent 
this by making D' (whether the drilling really takes place) 
a deterministic function of B, T and D as follows: 
(1) D' = f(B =$2M, T = nt, D =d)= yes 
{2) D' = f(B = $2M, T = nt, D = nd) = no 
(3) D' = f(B =$2M, T = tl, D =d)= yes 
(4) D' = f(B =$2M, T = tl, D = nd) =no 
(5) D' = f(B = $2M, T = t2, D = d) = yes 
(6) D' = f(B = $2M, T = t2, D = nd) =no 
(7) D' = f(B =$1M, T=nt, D= d)= yes 
(8) D' = f(B = $1M, T = nt, D = nd) = no 
(9) D' = f(B =$1M, T= tl, D= d)= yes 
(10) D'=f(B=$1M, T=t1,D=nd)=no 
(11) D' = f(B =$1M, T= t2, D= d) =no 
(12) D' = f(B = $1M, T = t2, D = nd) =no 
As line {11) indicates, the decision maker's purported 
decision to drill does not result in drilling if he or she does 
not have the money. 
Figure 3. ID for the oil wildcatter's problem with 
budget constraint having an effect on the 
decision function for D 
-
The complexity of Figure 3 is obviously undesirable. 
This suggests that we go beyond the standard ID 
definitions and allow relevance arrows into decision 
nodes. Such arrows would indicate both that the decision 
maker knows the value of the variables from which these 
arrows emanate when he or she makes the decision, and 
also that the variables constrain the decision. 
This suggests the following formal definitions. 
Definition l. A constraint on a variable X given a set 
of variables X 1 .... , X k is a mapping Cx from the frame 
of X 1, ... , Xk to subsets of the frame of X. (In other 
words, for each configuration x 1, ... , Xk of X 1, ... , Xk, 
we specify a set Cx(x1, ... , Xk) of permitted values for 
X.) 
Definition 3. An information/relevance influence 
diagram (IRID) is a DAG with variables as nodes, some 
of which are called chance variables and some of which 
are called decision variables, together with 
(1) a specification, for each chance node X, of a 
conditional for X given its parents, and 
(2) a specification, for each decision node a, of a 
constraint for a given a subset Sa of its parents. 
We divide the arrows into relevance arrows, which 
are solid, and informational arrows, which are 
dashed, as follows: 
(1) all arrows into a chance node X are relevance 
arrows, 
(2) arrows into a decision node !:t. from parents in Sa 
are relevance arrows, and 
(3) all other arrows into !:t. are informational arrows. 
Here, as in the case of IDs, we assume that there is a 
value node: a deterministic chance node which is a 
sink and is real-valued. 
We interpret IRIDs by assuming that when the decision 
maker makes decision !:t., he or she has observed all the 
parents of !:t.., including both those from which there are 
informational arrows and those from which there are 
relevance arrows. The relevance arrows indicate 
information for the decision maker as well as constraints 
on the decision. 
We assume complete ordering and no-forgetting for 
decision variables: 
(1) There is a path in the DAG consisting only of 
decision variables. (Some or all of the arrows on this 
path may be relevance arrows.) 
(2) If the decision variables, 1:t.1, ... , l:t.k, are ordered by 
the path that joins them and there is an arrow from X to 
�. then there is an arrow from X to l:t.j , for all i<j. 
(Again, there is no restriction on whether these arrows 
are relevance or informational arrows, or whether one is 
a relevance arrow and the other is an informational 
arrow.) 
Figure 4 shows how the budget constraint for the 
wildcatter problem can be represented in an IRID. We 
start with the ID of Figure 2. We create a chance node for 
the variable B. Then we draw an informational arrow 
from B to T, a relevance arrow from B to D, and we 
replace the informational arrow from T to D by a 
relevance arrow. 
Fi ure 4. IRID for the oil wildcatter's 
For the diagram of Figure 4 we specify the following 
conditionals and constraints: 
P(B = $1M)=0.50=1 - P(B =$2M) 
P(O = w) =0.60=1 - P(O = y) 
P(R=o I O=w, T=t1) =0.20=1-P(R=e I O=w, T=tl)  
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P(R=o I O=w, T=t2) =0.05=1-P(R=e I O=w, T = t2) 
P(R=o I O=y, T=t1)=0.90=1-P(R=e I O=y, T=t1) 
P(R=o I O=y, T=t2)=0.90=1-P(R=e I O=y, T=t2) 
P(R = nr I 0, T = nt) = 1.0 
V(O = w, T = nt. D = nd) = -$2,000,000 
V(O = y, T = nt. D = nd) = $0 
V(O = w, T = nt. D = d) =  $1,050,000 
V(O = y, T = nt. D = d) =  -$950,000 
V(O = w, T = t1, D = nd) = -$2,050,000 
V(O = y, T = t1, D = nd) = -$50,000 
V(O = w, T = t1, D = d) =  $1,000,000 
V(O = y, T = t1, D = d) =  -$1,000,000 
V(O = w, T = t2, D = nd) = -$2,100,000 
V(O = y, T = t2, D = nd) = -$100,000 
V(O = w, T = t2, D = d) = $950,000 
V(O = y, T = t2, D = d) = -$1,050,000 
Co(B =$1M, T = nt) = {d, nd} 
Co(B =$1M, T =  t1) = {d,nd} 
Co(B = $1M, T = t2) = { nd} 
Co(B =$2M, T = nt) = {d, nd} 
Co(B =$2M, T =  t1) = {d,nd} 
Co(B =$2M, T = t2) = {d, nd} 
Notice that the theory of stochastic dynamic programming 
that applies to IDs also applies to IRIDs; it is simply 
necessary that each step in the optimization respect the 
constraints. 
5 SOLVING IRIDS 
We begin this section with a review of the simulation 
algorithm for solving IDs given in Jenzarli (1995). Then 
we adopt the algorithm to IRIDs. Finally, we apply the 
adapted algorithm to the IRID of the oil wildcatter 
problem. 
Jenzarli (1995) shows how to use Gibbs sampling (Geman 
and Geman, 1984; and Gelfand and Smith, 1990), an 
iterative Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm (Hastings, 
1970), to implement stochastic dynamic programming for 
an influence diagram. For an ID with k decision variables 
!:t.1•···•!:t.k and sets r O•····r k as described in Section 3, 
we give a brief summary of the simulation algorithm. 
Our task is to find the decision function lit. This means 
finding, for each configuration ( y 0, y 1, ... , y k-t ) of 
r0u ... ur�c._1, the value dt of the decision !:t.k that 
optimizes 
Ed (vir o = 'Yo·r1 = 'Y1·····r t-1 = 'Yt-1)· (10) 
(Notice that we write dk in the place of S�r. as a subscript 
on the expectation operator; this is because the 
expectation for the configuration (y0, y1, ... , 'Yt-1) of the 
predecessors depends only on the value dk that sk 
assigns to this configuration.) To this end, we simply 
compute (10) for all dt and choose the dt that gives the 
optimal (largest or smallest depending on whether we are 
maximizing or minimizing) result. 
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To compute (10) for a particular dt, we recall that the 
conditional joint disttibution of r t u {V} is proportional 
to hdk (rt,VIro =r0 .... ,rt_1 =rt-d• which is simply 
the product of the conditionals for r t u {V}. We now 
give the steps involved in the computation of (10). 
(1) Delete all barren nodes form the ID (Shachter, 
1986). 
(2) Draw the ID according to the information 
partitioning implied by r0, ••• ,rt and omit 
informational arrows. 
(3) Form the moral graph. 
(4) Omit any variables from r t that are not connected 
with V in the subgraph of this moral graph determined 
by r t u {V}. The result is rt. 
(5) Omit any variables not in rt u {V} that are not 
neighbors of rt in the moral graph of Step 4. The 
variables that remain are the variables on which .dt 
depends that are not in rt u {V}. 
( 6) Draw the directed sub graph determined by all the 
variables that remain. 
(7) The factors remaining in the joint disttibution are 
those in which the variables remaining in rt are either 
parents or children. 
(8) Now that the factors are identified , we do Gibbs 
sampling with these factors to simulate the joint 
distribution of rt \ { .& t, V}. First, we fix the 
variables on which .dt depends that are not in 
rt u {V}. Then, for the configuration of 
rt \ {.&t, V} obtained at each step of the Gibbs 
sampling, we compute V. This gives a sequence of 
values for V simulating a random sample from its 
conditional disttibution, from which we may compute 
its conditional expectation. 
(9) When we move on to the next step of the stochastic 
dynamic program, we use the second of the two options 
discussed in Section 3. In other words, we absorb r t 
into r t-1• and we include the conditionals from r t in 
the new factorization of h11 • In order to avoid zero 
probabilities that would lii1terfere with the Gibbs 
sampling, we do not include the conditional for .dt 
corresponding to the decision function we have just 
found for .&t. Instead, we substitute this decision 
function in all the conditionals in which .& t appeared as 
a parent, thus eliminating .dt from the graph and 
producing arrows from the variables on which .dt 
depends to the variables for which it was a parent. 
The algorithm we have just described for IDs also works 
for IRIDs. The only point to note is that the relevance 
arrows into .dt must be included in the graph from which 
the moral graph is formed. We now apply the algorithm 
to the IRID of the oil wildcatter problem. Figure 5 shows 
the IRID of the oil wildcatter problem with informational 
arrows omitted, where 
r o = {B}, h0{B) = P{B), 
.&1 = T, r1 = {T,R}, h111 (T,RIB) = P{T)P(RjT,O), 
.&2 =D, r2 ={D,O},and 
hll2 (D,O, VIB, T,R)= P(DIT,B)P{O)P(VIT,D,O). 
Figure S. IRID of the oil wildcatter problem with 
informational arrows omitted 
We now form the moral graph as shown in Figure 6. 
Notice that according to Step 4 of the algorithm, 
r 2 = r2 . Also, all variables not in r2 u {V} are 
neighbors of r; in the moral graph of Figure 6. This 
means that the variables on which D depends are T, R, 
and B. Thus the factors to consider in the joint 
disttibution are those in which D and 0 are either parents 
or children. These factors on which we do Gibbs 
sampling are: 
P{R= •IT= •.O)P(D= •IT= •,B = •)P{O), 
where • means that the value of the variable in question is 
fixed. 
Fi re 6. Moral 
Next we do Gibbs sampling with these factors to simulate 
the posterior disttibution of 0. First, we fix the variables 
on which D depends, i.e., T, R, and B. Then for every 
value of 0, we compute V. This gives a sequence of 
values for V simulating a random sample from its 
conditional disttibution, from which we may compute its 
conditional expectation. We perform this step for every 
value of D, and we choose the value of D that corresponds 
to the maximum conditional expectation of V. 
When we move on to the next step of the stochastic 
dynamic program, we absorb r 2 into r 1 as described in 
Step 9 of the algorithm. Then we eliminate D from the 
graph, thus producing arrows from T, R, and B to V. The 
resulting graph is shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. DAG with D absorbed into its direct 
successors 
Finally, we include the conditionals from r 2 in the new 
factorization of b6 • In order to avoid zero probabilities 
that would interf� with the Gibbs sampling, we do not 
include the conditional for D corresponding to the 
decision function we bave just found for D. Instead, we 
substitute this decision function in all the conditionals in 
which D appeared as a parent. 
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